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Dahl: In re Mental Health of K.G.F.

NOTE

TAKING LIBERTIES: ANALYSIS OF
IN RE MENTAL HEALTH OF K G.F.
Elaine M. Dahl*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re Mental Health of KG.F., I the Montana Supreme
Court laudably espoused individual rights in involuntary civil
commitment proceedings, but the court's occasionally strained
analyses and failure to address case facts indicate KG.F. may
say the right things at the wrong time. Involuntary civil
commitment 2 is the process by which the state obtains a court
order requiring a mentally ill person to stay at a facility or to
follow a particular treatment program. 3 Commitment raises
* J.D. Candidate, The University of Montana, 2003. She thanks all those who read the
article and provided valuable comments, including Professor Jeffrey Renz, Pete
Mickelson, Julie Johnson, and Brady Peterson.
1. 2001 MT 140, 306 Mont. 1, 29 P.3d 485.
2. In this case note, the terms "involuntary civil commitment," "civil
commitment," and "involuntary commitment" are interchangeable. This note addresses
only commitment based on mental illness, not other types of civil commitment (e.g.,
juvenile commitment). Additionally, this note does not address treatment of sex
offenders, which may involve different procedural considerations.
3. MONT. CODE ANN., Title 53, Chapter 21, Part 1 governs involuntary civil
commitment based on mental illness. K.G.F., 1 26. Although K.G.F. was issued in 2001,
the court examined statutes in effect prior to the 2001 legislative session, so the year of
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complex issues, primarily because the state's authority to
commit stems both from its police powers and from the doctrine
of parens patriae. Recent scholarship has explored various
aspects of civil commitment, specifically examining the role of
counsel, the therapeutic value of commitment proceedings, and
the "sanist" and "pretextualist" undercurrents in mental health
law. While the KG.F. court acknowledged several tensions
inherent in civil commitment proceedings, its constitutional
analyses and abstract holdings may have enhanced, rather than
resolved, those tensions.
The KG.F. court only partially addressed the narrowly
defined issue of whether the respondent 4 received effective
assistance of counsel. 5 Rejecting the Strickland standard for
effective assistance of counsel, the court based its analysis on
K.G.F.'s right to due process and then identified dignity and
medical-decision personal autonomy as the fundamental rights
at risk. 6 The court adopted guidelines set by the National
Center for State Courts and added them to existing statutory
requirements, raising standards considerably for public
defenders and other attorneys who represent patientrespondents at commitment hearings. 7 Finally, the case was
remanded for a fact-finding hearing because the record was
insufficient.8 In 93 paragraphs, the KG.F. court did not actually
answer the question presented, 9 but raised several new
questions about mental health law and constitutional
interpretation. The court's failure to address defense counsel's
performance directly was an anticlimactic resolution after a
complicated and perhaps unnecessary constitutional analysis.
This note begins with an overview of the schools of thought
surrounding involuntary commitment and the role of counsel,
each statute quoted in K.G.F. is 1999, unless otherwise indicated. Of course, several of
these statutes remain unchanged. Rather than referring readers to 1999 statutes when
they may be identical to current versions, the citations in this article omit the years of
statutes.
4. "Patient-respondent" or "respondent" designates a person subject to
involuntary commitment proceedings. Although K.G.F. was the appellant in this case,
this note will refer to her by the term "respondent," her status at the lower court level.
5. KG.F., T 1.
6. Id.
33-40 (rejecting Strickland standards); J 41-43 (dicussing due process);
44-50 (discussing autonomy and dignity).
7. Id. $1 70-89, adopting portions of National Center for State Courts' Guidelines
for Involuntary Civil Commitment, reprinted in

10 MENT. & PHYS. DISABILITY L. REP.

409 (1986) (hereinafter "Guidelines").
8. Id.
93.
9. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Id. T 93.
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followed by a summary of the case facts, an overview of the
holdings and dissent, a step-by-step analysis of the opinion, and
its implications.
II. MENTAL HEALTH LAW CONCEPTS AND ISSUES
Because mental health law involves terms and concepts not
familiar to all lawyers, this section is designed to familiarize the
reader with issues relevant to K.G.F. Specifically, this section
analyzes the source of a state's authority to commit an
individual, the role of defense counsel in commitment
proceedings, therapeutic jurisprudence, and sanism and
pretextuality.
A. Police Power and ParensPatriae
Civil commitment straddles the "no man's land" between
civil and criminal law. The state derives its power to commit
mentally ill people from both the parenspatriaedoctrine and the
state's police powers. 10 The term parens patriae, derived from
the Latin "parent of his or her country," provides that the state
is the protector of those who cannot care for themselves." Police
power, reserved for the states by the 10th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, is the power "to make all laws necessary and
proper to preserve the public security, order, health, morality,
and justice."1 2 Although these justifications differ substantially,
most case law and statutory schemes treat all involuntary
13
commitment proceedings the same.
Perhaps because of its resemblance to other legal
proceedings, civil commitment clearly exemplifies an overlap of
police powers and parens patriae. Like criminal proceedings
that stem from the state's police powers, civil commitment

10. See Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Disordered,70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 58 (1982).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
12. Id. at 1178.
13. ROBERT F. SCHOPP, COMPETENCE, CONDEMNATION, AND COMMITMENT: AN
INTEGRATED THEORY OF MENTAL HEALTH LAw 5 (2001) ("Neither the statutes nor the
courts explain why the same parameters of commitment and conceptions of legal mental
illness should apply to both types of commitment."). See also Note, The Role of Counsel
in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 Yale L.J. 1540, 1549
(1975). Although this is an unsigned note, Steven J. Goode has been identified as the
author. Bibliography of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM RTS 915
(1993); Virginia Aldig6 Hiday, The Attorney's Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60
N.C. L. REV. 1027,1028, n.7 (1982).
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proceedings begin in the county attorney's office, provide for
14
appointed public defenders, and may result in a loss of liberty.
15
Police officers also play a role in some civil commitments.
Moreover, a civil commitment respondent may actually have
committed a criminal act. 16 Likewise, the similarities between
incompetence hearings and civil commitment proceedings may
justify the state's exertion of its parens patriae powers.
Although civil commitment does not require a finding of
incompetence,1 7 the inability to care for oneself is a criterion
considered in commitment proceedings and in declarations of
incompetence. Civil commitment may be defined as a hybrid of
criminal and civil "caretaking" proceedings.
B. The Role of Counsel
Largely because of the dual nature of civil commitment, the
role of counsel in involuntary commitments has long been the

14.
Paul S. Appelbaum has suggested that commitments based on the state's police
powers often involve "an inherently paternalistic element," because treatment is
sometimes needed to help a patient regain her liberty. PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A
REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 148 (Oxford U. Press
1994). For an argument that the state should not have the power of involuntary
commitment at all, see Morse, supra note 10.
15. Some law enforcement officials receive special training about handling
mentally ill people. See, e.g., www.omh.state.ny.us/omhwebfPolice/police.htm (providing
information about Police-Mental Health Coordination Project of New York).
16.
For Montana civil commitment cases involving the law enforcement system
and criminal acts, see, e.g., In re Shennum, 210 Mont. 442, 684 P.2d 1073 (1984) (police
intervened when respondent brought a semiautomatic pistol to a city council meeting
and expressed disdain for women voting and holding office, but only questioned him and
did not subject him to evaluation until the next day); In re J.B., 217 Mont. 504, 705 P.2d
598 (1985) (respondent was driving in circles in an open field and talked of demons and
religion when police stopped him); In re Mental Health of D.R.S., 221 Mont. 245, 718
P.2d 335 (1986) (respondent was unfit to stand trial for charges he robbed a store and
buried a tied-up clerk under a woodpile, but after 2 years his alleged crimes were
relevant in commitment proceedings); In re D.D., 277 Mont. 164, 920 P.2d 973 (1996)
(police officer took respondent to hospital for evaluation because had placed herbal
weight loss brochures in his oven and disabled his smoke alarm, and during the
evaluation respondent revealed his fears of an unknown couple and an unidentified gang
leader whom respondent believed intended to rape him and his habit of watching for
these people).
17. Incompetence is not a requirement for involuntary medication either. In re
Mental Health of S.C., 2000 MT 370,
10, 303 Mont. 444,
10, 15 P.3d 861,
10.
Scholars have debated whether incompetence should be a prerequisite finding for civil
commitment. See generally SCHOPP, supra note 13 (advocating the invocation of parens
patriae commitment only after a finding of incompetence); Michael L. Perlin, On
"Sanism," 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 394 (1992) (incompetence should not be presumed). It is
interesting to note a person must be deemed incompetent to stand trial in order to be
"kicked" from the criminal to the civil commitment system. See generally SCHOPP.
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subject of debate.' 8 Patient-respondents generally have a right
to counsel at all stages of commitment proceedings, 19 but the
responsibilities of counsel are not clearly defined. 20 Scholars
have frequently decried the lack of guidance for counsel in
involuntary commitment proceedings, noting that cases,
statutes, and codes of professional responsibility provide little or
21
no assistance.
The main disagreement centers on whether counsel should
play an "adversarial" or a non-adversarial, "best interests"
role. 22 Under the "adversarial" model, the lawyer ascertains the
wishes of the respondent and advocates for them, even if the
lawyer believes the respondent's decision is incorrect. 23 In the
"best interests" role, counsel ascertains a patient's best interest
and advocates for it, balancing liberty interests with other
concerns for the patient's welfare. 24 Of course, some scholars do
not identify with either the "best interests" or the "adversarial"
camp.
At least one scholar has suggested an alternative
"mediational role," 25 while another has argued the distinction

18. Yale Note, supra note 13, at 1542-43.
19. In some jurisdictions, the right to counsel may be waived. See, e.g., Matter of
S.Y., 469 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Wis. 1991) (constitutional right to self-representation extends
to respondents because they are "suitors"); Matter of Nelson, 1993 WL 52172 (Minn.
App. 1993) (unpub.).
20. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115(5) (specifying only the right to be
represented by counsel).
21. See Janet B. Abisch, Mediational Lawyering in the Civil Commitment Context:
A Therapeutic JurisprudenceSolution to the Counsel Role Dilemma, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POLVY & L. 120, 140 (1995); Joshua Cook, Note, Good Lawyering and Bad Role Models:
The Role of Respondent's Counsel in a Civil Commitment Hearing, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 179, 182 (2000); Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the
Representation of Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBLEMS, Summer 1982, at 162-63.
22. See Abisch, supra note 21, at 121. If the respondent is silent about the issue of
commitment, most adversarial role proponents would advise the attorney to assume the
respondent does not want to be committed. Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 21, at 173.
23.
Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 21, at 168. Cook, supra note 21, at 180.
24.
Cook, supra note 21, at 179-80; Appelbaum, supra note 14, at 214 (arguing a
patient's interest in civil liberties should not outweigh his interest in treatment). See
also Donald H.J. Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of
Revisions in Procedural,Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil
Commitment Law, 39 VAND. L. REV. 83, 85-86 (1986) (applauding the expansion of
procedural rights but characterizing as "inappropriate barriers" both limited
commitment criteria and least restrictive alteranative disposition requirements).
25. Abisch, supra note 21, at 122. For an argument that commitment should
consist of mediation with only limited lawyer involvement, see Joel Haycock et al.,
Mediating the Gap: Thinking About Alternatives to the Current Practice of Civil
Commitment, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 265, 282-89 (1994).
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between "adversarial" and "best interests" is altogether false. 26
Defining the defense attorney's role in civil commitment is
difficult because statutes and case law isolate civil commitment
as unique, but the process strongly resembles other legal
proceedings.
C. Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Mental health law gave rise to an academic movement
called therapeutic jurisprudence. David B. Wexler and Bruce J.
Winick, the originators of the term, defined it as "the extent to
which substantive rules, legal procedures, and the roles of
lawyers and judges produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic
consequences." 27
More recently, Winick defined it as "an
interdisciplinary field of legal scholarship and approach to law
reform that focuses attention upon law's impact on the mental
28
health and psychological functioning of those it affects."
Winick and Wexler suggested a limited application of
therapeutic jurisprudence when they originally advocated the
idea:
We are sensitive to the potential criticism of therapeutic
jurisprudence that has often been made of law and economics
scholarship. By suggesting the need to identify the therapeutic
and antitherapeutic consequences of legal rules and practices, we
do not necessarily suggest that such rules and practices be recast
to accomplish therapeutic ends or to avoid antitherapeutic results.
Whether they should is, of course, a normative question that calls
for a weighing of other potentially relevant normative values as
well, such as patient autonomy, constitutional rights, and
29
community safety.

26. Cook, supra note 21, at 188 (arguing "active" lawyers should be the standard
because "[tihe problems that authorities usually connect to the 'best interest' or
'adversary' lawyers are just plain bad lawyering").
27. David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New
Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979
(1991). Wexler and Winick traced their own books written in the 1990s and cited several
other scholars' analyses of therapeutic jurisprudence. Id. n. 9. Wexler was a contributor
to the Guidelines adopted by the KG.F. court. See 10 MENT. & PHYS. DISABILITY L.
REPORTER at 410.
28. Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment
Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 38 (1999).
29. Wexler & Winick, supra note 27, at 983. Some are not pleased with the
expansion of therapeutic jurisprudence concepts to other arenas. See Morris B. Hoffman,
TherapeuticJurisprudence,Neo-Rehabilitationism,and JudicialCollecitivism: The Least
Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 2063, 2069-70
(2002) (noting therapeutic jurisprudence-based programs yield unsatisfactory or
immeasurable results and arguing specialty courts grounded in therapeutic
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Answering the call to examine legal proceedings from a
therapeutic
jurisprudence
perspective,
mental
health
professionals and legal scholars have studied the effects of
involuntary commitment proceedings on patient-respondents. 3 °
Several scholars have argued patient-respondents benefit
therapeutically
when
the
commitment
procedure
is
31
adversarial.
However, this position has not gone without
32
criticism.
In the absence of clear-cut evidence of therapeutic effects,
the relative merits of counsel's potential roles remains
uncertain. A "best interests" lawyer could defer to a mental
health professional's judgment about the impact of an
adversarial proceeding on a respondent and ignore the
respondent's voice in determining therapeutic value. However,
an "adversarial" lawyer might be too occupied with protecting a
respondent's civil liberties to recognize the effects of hearingrelated stress on the respondent's mental health. In other
words, therapeutic jurisprudence is an ideal that provides
support for and criticism of both types of lawyering.
Therapeutic jurisprudence considerations may motivate lawyers
following either model to investigate more thoroughly and listen
33
more attentively.
D. Sanism and Pretextuality
Michael L. Perlin, a prolific writer in the field of mental
illness law, 34 has focused on two themes: sanism and
jurisprudence result in "de facto decriminalization" of crimes).
30. See, e.g., Sumner J. Sydeman, et al., ProceduralJustice in the Context of Civil
Commitment: A Critique of Tyler's Analysis, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 207 (1997)
(reviewing a study by T.R. Tyler of the therapeutic effect of legal procedure in
commitments). Other scholars have disagreed with some of Sydeman's view of Tyler.
Sydeman is cited merely as illustrative of the continuing discussion of therapeutic
effects.
31. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407 (2000).
32. Sydeman, supra note 30, at 217 (questioning long-term effects on treatment
and suggesting respondent cynicism, asocial feelings, and mental capacity may dampen
therapeutic effects). See also Abisch, supra note 21, at 124-28 (noting adversarial
approach can result in increased undercommitments, higher stress levels for
respondents, contributes to increased tension between attorneys and clinicians, may
encourage respondents to view treatment teams "as adversaries to be defeated," and may
create a false "appearance of fairness" to society as a whole).
33. See Cook, supra note 21, for position that "active" lawyers in both roles do the
same things in preparing for a hearing. Therapeutic jurisprudence may also motivate
courts to consider the impact of their rulings on future respondents.
34. Perlin recently published a book that draws from some of his law review
articles and provides insight into his perspectives on mental illness law. MICHAEL L.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2003

7

302

MONTANA
REVIEW
Montana Law
Review, Vol. LAW
64 [2003],
Iss. 1, Art. 11

Vol. 64

pretextuality.
Sanism is defined as prejudice against the
35
mentally ill, particularly as reflected in the legal system.
Tracing the historical view of mental illness as "linked to sin,
evil, God's punishment, crime, and demons," 36 Perlin noted the
tendency of society to classify the mentally ill as "the Other"
because of people's fear that "all of us could become mentally
ill."37
Among other "sanist myths," Perlin listed the
presumptions that mentally ill people are incompetent and that
mentally
ill
people
who
refuse
medication
need
38
institutionalization.
Perlin defines pretextuality as follows:
Pretextuality means that courts accept (either implicitly or
explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in
dishonest (frequently meretricious) decision making, specifically
where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high
propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve
desired ends."
This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all
participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect
for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy
lawyering, blas6 judging, and, at times, peijurious and/or corrupt
39
testifying.

Pretextuality relates to the role of counsel in that "best
interests" lawyers may defer to treatment professionals'
opinions, whereas "adversarial" attorneys test the accuracy and
credibility of a professional's statements in the same manner as
they would any expert.
Minimizing prejudices and helping respondents may appear
to be self-apparent concepts, but the existence of scholarship in
these areas indicates that courts have not always considered
them. The KG.F. opinion demonstrates the Montana Supreme
Court's awareness of these concepts, as well as its struggle to
define the role of counsel in light of the dual nature of the state's
authority in civil commitment.

PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL (Am. Psychol. Ass'n

2000). Perlin also authored an oft-cited three volume set in which he has praised K.G.F.
as "the most comprehensive and thoughtful post-Strickland case." MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
MENTAL DIsABLITY LAw:CIvIL AND CRIMINAL (2d Ed. LEXIS L. Pub. 1998 & Supp. 2001)
(1989). This is not surprising, since the KG.F. court cited Perlin's works.
35. Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L.REV. 373, 374 (1992) (hereafter
"Sanism"). Perlin credited Morton Birnbaum with coining the term "sanism." Id. at 374
n.5.
36. Id. at 388.
37. Perlin, On "Sanism,"supra note 35, at 389-93.
38. Id. at 394-95.
39. HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 34, at xix.
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III. CASE FACTS
K.G.F.40 is a woman diagnosed with mixed rapid cycling
bipolar disorder. 4 1 Bipolar disorder, once commonly known as
manic-depression, consists of alternating periods of euphoria
and depression. 42 Mixed rapid cycling indicates that a patient's
moods alternate quickly, and she can experience mania and
depression at the same time. 43 K.G.F. underwent treatment
with a psychiatric professional near her hometown outside
Bozeman, and she managed her condition with medication. 4 ' In
October of 1999, K.G.F. became suicidal, sought mental health
treatment, and was voluntarily admitted to St. Peter's
45
Community Hospital in Helena on October 21, 1999.
Concerned with the medications prescribed for her at St.
Peter's, K.G.F. questioned her treatment and ultimately refused
to take prescribed medication. 46 On October 25, she expressed
her desire to leave St. Peter's against medical advice, but she
never signed a written request.47 St. Peter's employee Nancy
McVean 48 asked a deputy county attorney to petition for K.G.F.'s
involuntary commitment because K.G.F.'s treatment team

40. In light of anonymity provisions in Montana's involuntary commitment
statutes and the convention of identifying respondents by their initials, KG.F.'s
anonymity will remain protected in this note. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-103 (2001).
41. KG.F., 5; Resp't Br. 2.
42. STEDMAN'S CONCISE MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS
ILLUSTRATED 118 (John H. Dirckx, ed., 4th ed. 2001).
43. Interview with Anita Roessman, Montana Advocacy Program (February 1,
2002); KG.F., 5.
44. KG.F., 6.
45. Id. 4; Appellant Br. 1; Resp't Br. 3.
46. KG.F., 7; Tr. Dist. Ct. at 5:6-8; 9:6-10. Lithium is the only drug approved by
the FDA for bipolar disorder, but it has side effects and is not effective for some patients,
including mixed rapid-cyclers. Heather S. Hopkins & Alan J. Gelenberg, Treating
BipolarDisorder: Toward the Third Millennium, 18 Psych. Times, Issue 2 (Feb. 2001) at
The medications prescribed for K.G.F. were
www. mhsource.com/pt/p010283.html.
Topamax (topiramate) and Risperdal, which are anticonvulsants found to be somewhat
effective in bipolar disorder treatment. One side effect of Topamax is weight loss, so it is
sometimes prescribed for patients concerned with weight. Id. Additionally, researchers
have recently discovered a causal connection between Topamax and the eye conditions
glaucoma and myopia. Important Drug Warning, letter from Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc.,
at www.fda.gov/medwatchlSAFETY/2001/topamax.htm.
47. KG.F., 7; Reply Br. 4; Resp. Br. 3. Appellant argued that because MONT.
CODE ANN. § 53-21-111(1)(b)(i) provided a request for release from voluntary admission
"must be in writing," KG.F. remained voluntarily committed when the involuntary
commitment petition was filed and even during the hearing. Reply Br. 4.
48. KG.F.,
8. McVean identified her occupation as "case coordinator" and
affirmed she was a recognized professional person. Tr. Dist. Ct. at 3:1-7.
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believed she presented a threat to herself 4 9
On October 26, K.G.F. had a preliminary hearing in which
the court explained her rights and appointed counsel.5 0 On
51
October 27, the involuntary commitment hearing occurred.
At the commitment hearing, McVean testified for the State,
and Nancy Adams testified on K.G.F.'s behalf.52 McVean
recommended K.G.F. go to New Visions, a community treatment
center, only until she stabilized and then seek aftercare services
in Bozeman. 53 Noting that K.G.F. "already knows the Support
Center [St. Peter's]," Adams recommended that K.G.F. stay
54
voluntarily at St. Peter's before returning to Bozeman.
However, Adams did not know what community based
treatment was available in Bozeman, primarily because "the
mental health district ha[d] been broken up. 55 K.G.F.'s counsel
cross-examined McVean and directly examined Adams about
56
their proposals.
After Adams testified, K.G.F's counsel requested that
K.G.F. be allowed to testify. 57 The following dialogue ensued:
The court:Is there any possibility of continuing this? Finish it off
later?
Mr. Menahan [for the State] :That would be fine. We can come
back this afternoon. The state doesn'tanticipate calling any more

witnesses.
The court:Never mind. I will just skip my meeting. Go ahead.
Please be sworn. Come up here and be sworn. I just can't make
58
plans.

Defense counsel asked K.G.F. what support was available to her
and then rested.
The district court then asked defense counsel what the
49.

Tr. Dist. Ct. at 4:20-24.

50.

KG.F., 9.

51. Id.
52. Tr. Dist. Ct. at 2-16; K.G.F., 9110-12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-118 provides
respondents with the right to examination by a professional person of their own
choosing.
53. KG.F., 9111; Tr. Dist. Ct. at 6:14-18. McVean testified that K.G.F. "is very,
very bright. She can present like-that things are okay and she can make it through."
Tr. Dist. Ct. 5:11-13. The treatment team debated what to recommend for K.G.F.
because one doctor believed K.G.F. "might be able to present herself and be released too
soon." Tr. Dist. Ct. at 6:23-24.
54. KG.F., 9112; Tr. Dist. Ct. at 16:1-2.
55. Tr. Dist. Ct. at 12:22-13:5.
56. Id. at 2-16.
57. Id. at 16:15-16.
58. Id. at 16:17-24.
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respondent wanted. 59 Defense counsel indicated K.G.F. wished
to remain voluntarily at St. Peter's until she could arrange for
treatment in Bozeman. 60 When the court asked defense counsel
if K.G.F. had already signed a second voluntary commitment
application, he answered, "I understand she is willing to do so."61
The district court's deliberation consisted of the following
exchange:
The court:Has she [reapplied for voluntary commitment] yet at
Because I can't order her to sign a voluntary
this point?
commitment. The only thing I can do-what you are requesting is
dismiss this. She needs treatment. There is no question that this
woman needs treatment. And she needs community treatment.
But I can't order her to St. Peter's Hospital.
K.G.F.:If I volunteer to goThe court:I know.
K.G.F.:I offered to sign to continue my stay voluntarily when I was
there for the-I would sign voluntarily again.
Mr. Menahan [for the State]:I don't think that you can order her to
go back to a level of care that is for acute care when she doesn't
need that and then follow through on a treatment plan that hasn't
been established.
The court:The finding that I make is that you need treatment in
the community. You have a mental disorder that requires
treatment. The least restrictive, most appropriate alternative for
you is treatment in the community. The treatment that is
available for you in this community is Golden Triangle, the mental
health services that they provide out of there. And there is
nothing else that I can send you to at this point because I can't-I
can't dismiss the petition. And I can't order you to voluntarily
commit yourself to St. Peter's Hospital. And I am not willing to
dismiss the petition because that means that you are not going to
have any community health services available to you. So I guess
what I have to do is grant the state's petition. I don't think I have
that commitment should be for a
any other alternative. And 62
period of up to 90 days. Okay?

K.G.F. appealed the district court's order, claiming she had
Specifically, she
received ineffective assistance of counsel.
offered by the
to
hearsay
to:
(1)
object
counsel
failed
argued
63
(2) prepare adequately for
State's professional person,

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 18:10-11.
Id. at 18:12-19.
Tr. Dist. Ct. at 18:20-23.
Tr. Dist. Ct. at 18:24-20:8.
Appellant Br. at 8-10; Reply Br. at 12-16.
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hearing, 64 (3) ascertain K.G.F. was still voluntarily admitted, as
she had not provided a written request for release, 65 (4) request
additional time to prepare for the hearing, 66 (5) present
sufficient evidence, 67 (6) question the professional persons and
K.G.F. adequately, 68 (7) attempt to have K.G.F.'s husband
appointed as a "friend of the respondent" until three weeks after
the hearing, 69 and (8) request a separate posttrial disposition
hearing, despite insufficient knowledge of available alternatives
70
in her hometown.
Initially, K.G.F. argued that the standards governing Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, as outlined
in Strickland v. Washington,7 1 provided the basis of her
argument. 72 After both the Montana Advocacy Program (MAP)
writing as amicus curiae for respondent and the State argued a
due process standard was more appropriate, 73 K.G.F. argued
alternatively that counsel was ineffective under a due process
analysis. 74
MAP recommended a standard for effective
assistance of counsel, which appeared in a set of guidelines
established by the National Center for State Courts (hereinafter
75
"Guidelines").
IV. HOLDINGS OF KG.F. AND DISSENT: AN OVERVIEW

A brief overview of the KG.F. court's holdings demonstrates
the complexities of the issues presented. The court first set the
standard of review as plenary. 76 Rejecting the Strickland
standard, 77 the court based the right to counsel in involuntary
64. Appellant Br. at 12-13, 15.
65. Id. at 12-13; Reply Br. at 3-5.
66. Reply Br. at 7-8.
67. Id. at 8-12.
68. Appellant Br. at 11-14.
69. Reply Br. at 5-7.
70. Reply Br. at 16-18.
71. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
72. Appellant Br. 4
73. Resp't Br. at 7; Amicus Br., entire. The Montana Advocacy Program filed the
Amicus Brief, which was signed by the ACLU. K.G.F. n. 2. An ACLU attorney not only
signed the brief, but contributed to its preparation as well. Interview, Beth Brenneman,
ACLU Attorney, Missoula, Montana (Jan. 24, 2002).
74. Reply Br. at 1; KGF., $ 23.
75. Amicus Br. at 13-16, citing Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment,
reprinted in 10 MENTAL & PHYs. DISABILITY L. REP. 410 (1986). The KG.E. court
adopted these guidelines, as discussed below. KG.E., 1$ 70-89.
76. KG.F., T 17.
77. Id. 9 33-40.
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commitment proceedings on Montana's constitutional due
process, dignity, and privacy provisions. 78
Then, it found
statutory references to dignity, privacy, and bodily integrity
invoked corresponding constitutional rights. 79
Noting the
stigma historically and currently associated with mental
illness,8 0 the court criticized governmental paternalism for its
"stereotypical labels" of the mentally ill8l and then recognized
the purpose of involuntary commitment is "to help, not punish"
respondents.8 2 Before delineating new standards for counsel,
the court stressed the importance of "formally and fairly"
balancing the rights of the state under parens patriaeand police
powers with an individual's statutory and constitutional
83
rights.
Defining counsel's role as adversarial,8 4 the court cited
counsel's statutory duties to meet with the respondent and
explain the proceedings,8 5 to review all available records,8 6 to
discuss options and ascertain the respondent's wishes,8 7 to
request necessary additional time before a hearing or trial,8 8 to
facilitate examination of the respondent by a professional person
of the respondent's choosing,8 9 and to assist the respondent in
waiving the right to remain silent.90 By adopting selected
Guidelines, the court expanded those statutory duties to include
meeting competency standards, 9 1 discussing the consequences of
pursuing various options, 92 seeking interviews with all persons
with knowledge of the surrounding circumstances, 93 and
scheduling the initial interview sufficiently before any scheduled
94
hearings.
78.
art. II, §
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
41-50 (citing MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17 (due process); MONT. CONST.
4 (dignity); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 (privacy)).
Id. 1 44-48.
Id. It 51-55, 59-60.
Id. IT 59-60.
K.G.F., 63.
Id. 1 65.
Id. IT 66, 84-89.
Id.
67, 77 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-121(3)).
Id. 9174 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-21-115; -165).
Id. 1 75, 79 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-127(2)).
K.G.F.,
75, 79 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-122(2), (3)).
Id. 9 80.
Id. 83.
Id. 9171 (citing Guidelines, Part El at 464).
Id. 75 (citing Guidelines, Part E2 at 465).
K.G.F., 1 76 (citing Guidelines, Part E5(c) at 474).
Id. 1 78 (citing Guidelines, Part E5, at 473).
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After setting these standards, the court issued its conclusion
in four paragraphs. 95 First, the court reiterated its holding that
96
a respondent has the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Second, the court qualified its delineation of counsel's duties by
stating the list was not exhaustive. 97 Due process provided the
basis for respondent's rights, and the fundamental liberty
interests at stake were dignity and integrity. 98 An ineffective
counsel claim requires a "substantial showing of evidence" in
order to stand. 99 The court then noted the responsibility of the
courts as well as of counsel to ensure respondents' rights. 10 0
Finally, the case was remanded for a hearing because the record
lacked any evidence of a pre-hearing investigation. 10 1
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Trieweiler raised
significant concerns about the majority opinion. He believed
K.G.F. may burden public defenders to do the impossible and
burden courts to enforce effective assistance of counsel in every
case. 10 2 Specifically, he worried that K.G.F. could be interpreted
to mandate a post-commitment hearing to determine
commitment. 10 3
every
after
counsel
of
effectiveness
Additionally, he found it inconsistent to afford commitment
respondents special rights to remain silent and to counsel when
criminal defendants face similar deprivation of liberty. 10 4 Most
disturbing to Trieweiler was the lack of evidence in the record to
10 5
support K.G.F.'s appeal.
V. ANALYSIS OFK.G.F.
This section analyzes issues raised by K.G.F. First, despite
the court's failure to address the case facts directly, the court's
decision may have rested in part on those facts. Second,
rejecting Strickland standards was consistent with this court's
prior case law differentiating civil commitment from criminal
proceedings. Third, the court's treatment of parens patriae and
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. TT 90-93.
Id. T 90.
Id. T191.
Id.
K.G.F., 91.
Id. 92.
Id. T193.
Id. [1 107, 110 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
Id. 91110 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
Id. 9198 (Trieweiler, J. dissenting).
K.G.F, 9199 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
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stigma was paradoxical.
Fourth, the court's constitutional
analysis was convoluted and perhaps unnecessary. Fifth, the
opinion left several practical questions unanswered when the
court adopted new standards without indicating how those
standards applied to K.G.F.'s counsel. Finally, remanding the
case raises several procedural questions for future civil
commitments.
A. K. G.F.'s Case Facts
The court neither addressed the facts presented regarding
counsel's representation nor limited its opinion in any manner,
but its decision may have depended to some degree on the nearly
ideal scenario presented. K.G.F. was intelligent, articulate,
knowledgeable about her illness, familiar with the mental
health system, and non-threatening to other people. 10 6 She had
voluntarily sought treatment for her suicidal tendencies.
Bipolar disorder, her mental illness, is perceived by many as
more understandable and less threatening than disorders like
schizophrenia. K.G.F. understood her need for treatment and
contested only the regimen prescribed. Her age and gender may
10 7
also have been factors.
Whether or not K.G.F.'s counsel acted properly, the
commitment was probably unjustified. However, it is uncertain
why K.G.F. based her appeal solely on ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, rather than arguing the district court had not
chosen the "least restrictive alternative."'0 8 The order to keep
K.G.F. in Helena was almost certainly error, but the
responsibility for this error lies, at least in part, with the district
court. 09
B. Rejecting Strickland: Maintainingthe Wall Between Civil
and CriminalLaw
The K.G.F. court's recognition of a right to effective
assistance of counsel and rejection of Strickland standards was
106. In all likelihood, she would easily survive an incompetence proceeding.
107. Cf In re Mental Health of E.M., 265 Mont. 211, 215, 875 P.2d 355, 357 (1994)
(Hunt, J., dissenting) (noting respondent was a 57-year old widow in his determination
that she performed no "overt acts" when she threatened to kill her neighbor and herself
because she believed the neighbor had cut holes in her long johns, smeared feces on her
toilet, and interfered with her radio and TV reception).
108. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-127(5).
109. As Justice Trieweiler noted, "effective representation cannot change reality."
KGF., [ 107 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
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proper and consistent with prior case law. A respondent has
"the right to be represented by counsel" under Mont. Code Ann.
§ 53-21-115(5). Following case law in other jurisdictions, the
court first established that Montana's statutory right to counsel
implicitly guaranteed a right to effective assistance of counsel. 110
The court then discussed the standard by which counsel's
effectiveness should be judged."'
The court correctly chose due process over Sixth
Amendment Strickland standards as appropriate for evaluating
counsel's performance in civil commitment. In Strickland v.
Washington,112 a defendant convicted of three murders and
sentenced to death for each count unsuccessfully claimed his
counsel was ineffective. The United States Supreme Court set
forth a two-pronged test to determine whether counsel was
unconstitutionally ineffective: (1) Did counsel act within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases?
and (2) Did counsel's performance prejudice the defense so that
113
the defendant was denied a fair trial?
Other jurisdictions had previously considered whether
Strickland standards were appropriate to evaluate counsel's
performance in involuntary commitments. The KG.F. court
noted cases from other jurisdictions in which effectiveness of
counsel was subjected to Strickland analysis. An Illinois court
applied the Strickland standard in In re Carmody.114 In In re
Hutchinson,115 a Pennsylvania court found respondent's counsel
was ineffective and could have no reasonable basis for failing to
object to hearsay testimony offered by the Commonwealth's
expert. 1 16 Other cases analyzing effectiveness of counsel in
involuntary commitment cases were not cited in KG.F. Indiana
courts have applied the Strickland standard and rejected
respondents' ineffective assistance of counsel claims because

110. K.G.F.,
30-31 (citing In re Carmody, 653 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ill. App. 1995); In
re Commitment of Hutchinson, 454 A.2d 1008, 1011 (Pa. 1982). See also McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
111. Id. IT 32-50.
112. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
113. Id. at 687, cited in State v. Berg, 1999 MT 282,
28, 296 Mont. 546, 28, 991
P.2d 428, 28.
114. 653 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. 1995), cited in KG.F.,
29-30, 33, 36.
115. 421 A.2d 261 (Pa. Super. 1980), cited in KG.F., 1 30. Although Hutchinson did
not mention Strickland by name, the test seeking any "reasonable basis" indicates the
court employed Strickland.
116. Id. at 266.
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they could not demonstrate prejudice to their defenses. 117 An
Arizona court did not specify the constitutional basis for a
respondent's right to counsel, but appears to have ordered a
Strickland analysis on remand."l 8 Cases from Florida, Texas,
and Wisconsin have grounded the right to assistance of counsel
in due process. 1 19
When jurisdictions split on a particular issue, a state can
look to its own case law for its position on similar issues.
Montana has frequently noted the differences between the rights
of criminal defendants and the rights of civil commitment
respondents.
In Kerr v. Wilcox, 120 involuntary commitment
statutes did not apply to an appointed lawyer's representation of
a criminal defendant ultimately deemed mentally ill.121 A
criminal statute122 providing that an expert must examine a
defendant before testifying about his mental condition did not
apply in a civil commitment hearing in In re Mental Health of
G.S. 123 Similarly, in In re Mental Health of L.C.B.,
the
exclusionary rule did not apply in an involuntary commitment
hearing. 124
However, the K.G.F. court did not cite these
precedents in its determination of an appropriate standard.
According to the K.G.F. court, applying the Strickland
standard to involuntary commitment proceedings
was
inappropriate for four reasons. First, the Sixth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution and Article II, Section 24, of the Montana
Constitution expressly applied to "criminal prosecutions"
117. K.W. v. Logansport State Hosp., 660 N.E.2d 609, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996);
Jones v. Indiana, 477 N.E.2d 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
118. In re Pima County Mental Health Svc. Action No. MH-2116-1, 757 P.2d 118
(Ariz. App. 1988) (identifying right to counsel as a fundamental right, not specifying the
Sixth Amendment, but requiring an evidentiary hearing despite the civil nature of the
case).
119. Pullen v. Florida, 2001 WL 1044808, rev'g 764 So.2d 704 (agreeing with lower
court that due process, and not the Sixth Amendment, provided the basis of the
respondent's right to counsel, but determining the Anders procedure for withdrawing
representation applied to involuntary commitments); Ex parte Ullmann, 616 S.W.2d 278,
283-84 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (attorney appointed to represent 23 people with only 4 days
notice could not meet the requirements of effective assistance); Lessard v. Schmidt, 379
F. Supp. 1376, 1378, 1380 (1974), subsequent history omitted (declaring Wisconsin
involuntary commitment statutes as invalid). Lessard is regarded by many to be the
first case to recognize due process rights.
120. 225 Mont. 313, 731 P.2d 1326 (1987).
121. Kerr, 225 Mont. at 316, 731 P.2d at 1327-28 (rejecting former defendant's
constitutional tort claims against the state for violation of his civil rights).
122. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-213(1).
123. 215 Mont. 384, 389, 698 P.2d 406, 410 (1985).
124. 253 Mont. 1, 7, 830 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1992).
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alone. 125 Second, "[The Strickland standard] simply does not go
far enough to protect the liberty interests of individuals such as
K.G.F., who may or may not have broken any law, but who,
upon the expiration of a 90-day commitment, must indefinitely
bear the badge of inferiority of a once "involuntarily committed"
person with a proven mental disorder."1 26 Third, as noted by
"legal commentary," the Strickland presumption of trial strategy
and deference to counsel's judgment is inappropriate when the
hearing procedure generally does not encourage high standards
of care for lawyers. 127 Finally, requiring a respondent to show
prejudice, as the Strickland standard would do, runs counter to
Montana's case law mandating strict adherence to civil
commitment statutes. 128 Although the K.G.F. court failed to cite
Montana precedent that would support its rejection of
Because
Strickland, its ultimate conclusion was sound.
Montana has generally based its involuntary commitment
jurisprudence in statutes and maintained a "wall" between the
laws governing civil and criminal proceedings, 129 embracing
statutory due process provisions and rejecting Strickland was
consistent with precedent.
C. Stigma and ParensPatriaeStereotypes
In its discussion of stereotypes associated with stigma and
parens patriae, the K.G.F. court displayed the conflict between
ideals and reality. The court criticized paternalist and sanist
viewpoints, but also based its holdings at least in part on these
views. While the court indicated mental illness should hold no
stigma, it reinforced that stigma in its holding that commitment
is a fate to be avoided. Additionally, the K.G.F. court expressed
a "love-hate" relationship with the parens patriae aspect of
involuntary commitment. 30 These discussions demonstrated
125. KG.F., IT 28, 39.
126. Id. 1 33. See discussion of sanism and pretextuality, infra.
127. Id. $1 34-35 (citing Michael L. Perlin, FatalAssumption: A CriticalEvaluation
of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 39, 53-54
(1992)). Whether two pages of a single law review article suffices as justification is
perhaps subject to debate.
128. KG.F., 38.
129. The Montana Supreme Court has apparently confused criminal and civil
commitment proceedings at least once, describing evidence of a respondent's statements
in a civil commitment proceeding as "not incriminating." In re Shennum, 210 Mont. 442,
454, 684 P.2d 1073, 1080 (1984).
130. Although the court acknowledged the state's police power to initiate
58, only parens patriae powers were
involuntary commitment proceedings, KG.F.,
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the inherent conflict that sometimes exists between an
individual's rights and the state's interest in serving certain
people's needs.
The court acknowledged several stereotypes associated with
mental illness, commitment proceedings, and parens patriae.
Finding it "necessary to recognize and dispel certain stereotypes
that serve only to frustrate the legal process," 131 the court
disapproved of phrases defining the state's role as "father of the
1 32
country" and "general guardian of all.. .idiots and lunatics."
Quoting a California case, the court noted that, "'[i]n the ideal
society, the mentally ill would be the subjects of understanding
and compassion rather than ignorance and aversion... [b]ut that
enlightened view, unfortunately, does not yet prevail. 13 3 Then
the court shifted from idealism to society's stereotypes, again
quoting the California case: .'It is implausible that a person
labeled by the state as so totally ill could go about, after his
release, seeking employment, applying to schools, or meeting old
' 34
acquaintances with his reputation fully intact.""
The K.G.F. court acknowledged the stigma associated with
mental illness, but did not explain how its decision would
counteract society's sanist views.1 3 5 In fact, the court actually
perpetuated this stigma by describing a respondent as one "who,
upon the expiration of a 90-day commitment, must indefinitely
bear the badge of inferiority of a once 'involuntarily committed'
person.' 36 Apparently, the court does not share society's sanist
views, but believes them pervasive enough to warrant legal
protection from the mental health system.
Characterizing
discussed in detail. Id.
51-65.
131. Id.
51.
59-60 (rejecting language from In re Sonsteng, 175 Mont. 307, 314, 573
132. Id.
P.2d 1149, 1153). It is not clear whether the court considered "father of the country" and
.general guardian" to be "stereotypical labels," or if the only objectionable labels were
"idiots and lunatics." If "father" and "guardian" are unconstitutional labels, then the
entire parens patriae doctrine and any civil commitments attained under its authority
are arguably unconstitutional.
133. KG.F.,
54 (quoting Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1979)).
Scholars centered on the distinction between incompetence and subjection to involuntary
commitment may note that the issue in Roulet was whether a conservator established a
person's "grave disability" in order to maintain her control over the person's estate.
Moreover, it does not appear K.G.F. was as "totally ill" as the subject of Roulet.
134. Id. 53 (quoting Roulet, 590 P.2d at 7).
135. In fact, in the midst of its discussion ofparens patriae, the court engaged in an
awkward self-congratulatory discussion of the history of mental illness stigma and due
process analyses. K.G.F.,
60-62 (discussing the progress of society's treatment of the
mentally ill from Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) to a more "enlightened" state).
136. KG.F., 33 (emphasis added).
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commitment proceedings as adversarial and raising standards
for counsel may send the message that commitment is a fate to
be avoided at all costs. While the court's recognition of the
stigma associated with commitment was necessary, its silence
about the implications of its own ruling on that stigma is
frustrating.
Even more frustrating was the court's apparent desire to
invoke the parens patriae doctrine without acknowledging that
to do so would be paternalistic. 137 The court cautioned that "we
must.. .be cautious and critical of signs of paternalism
legitimized by the parens patriae doctrine...." 138 However, the
jurisprudence
therapeutic
acknowledged
also
court
considerations and even implied Montanans have a fundamental
right to understanding and compassion. Despite the negative
stereotypes associated with parens patriae justifications, the
court defined the purpose of civil commitment as "to help, not
punish"'139 the respondent. According to the court, public policy
dictates that the "therapeutic influence" of the hearing should be
maintained, especially since some people are deterred from
seeking professional help because they fear the possibility of
involuntary commitment. 40 Citing a recent law review article,
the court noted that the "ideals" of "understanding and
compassion" are expressed in the dignity clause of the Montana
Constitution.' 4 ' If understanding and compassion are implicit in
the dignity clause, Montanans have a fundamental right to
137. Any teenager might make a similar argument: "I want you to be my parents,
not tell me what to do!"
138. K.G.F., 62, (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-101, which provides the purpose
of the statutes is in part to "secure.. .the care and treatment suited to the needs of the
person" and "ensure due process of law"). No mention of the state's police power appears
in this statement of purpose. However, a court is required by § 53-21-126(1) to consider
whether the respondent has caused injury to others or poses an imminent threat, as well
as the respondent's ability to care for herself. The omission of police power justifications
from the statement of purpose is unclear.
139. Id. 63.
140. Id. (citing National Institute for Mental Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Svcs., Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General (1999)). Incidentally, the
State Bar of Montana requires bar applicants to disclose any diagnosis or treatment of
mental illness , along with criminal convictions and debt, to ascertain whether an
applicant is "fit" to practice. 2003 State Bar of Montana Application, Questions 9-10.
See also Section 2(c), Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Character and Fitness of
the Supreme Court of Montana (defining "fitness"). The State Bar apparently assumes
the risk that some people may be deterred from seeking treatment by this requirement,
remaining undiagnosed and untreated.
55, citing Matthew 0. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the
141. Id.
Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution's "Dignity" Clause with Possible
Applications, 61 MONT. L. REV. 301, 330-332 (2000).
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receive understanding and compassion from the state. Such a
conclusion should strengthen the state's parens patriae powers
of commitment, since commitment arguably "protects" an
rights
to
compassion
and
individual's
fundamental
understanding.
The court's assertion that parens patriae powers threaten
privacy rights to personal autonomy in medical decisions may
indicate a hierarchy in which privacy rights outweigh the
dignity right to understanding and compassion. If the state can
only help respondents without infringing on their autonomy, the
civil commitment process could never be "involuntary," and the
statutory scheme should be abolished entirely. However, in
light of the ultimate holding, this was apparently not the court's
intended meaning.
The stereotypes surrounding mental illness and parens
patriaecertainly should have influenced the court's decision, but
the court's treatment of these stereotypes leaves uncertainties.
First, the procedural safeguards instituted in K.G.F. may send a
message that treatment is always to be avoided, in part because
Second, safeguarding
mentally ill people are ostracized.
individuals from society's stereotypes by raising standards for
defense counsel may be as inherently paternalistic as a "best
interests" model. Finally, the court's criticism of paternalistic
parens patriae authority, combined with its embrace of
therapeutic jurisprudence goals, leaves the state of parens
patriaejustifications in flux.
D. ConstitutionalDue ProcessAnalysis: The "Turnings"
The court twice employed a remarkable method of
constitutional and statutory interpretation by which it found
statutes "in turn" provided for constitutional rights. First, the
court found statutory rights to due process and to counsel "[i]n
turn.. .garner protection under both the federal and the
Montana constitutions."14 2 Second, the court found statutes
providing for an admitted patient's dignity, privacy, and
personal integrity "in turn.. .invoke fundamental rights under
our state constitution." 143
This "turning" runs counter to
traditional doctrine that provides courts should decide
constitutional issues only after exhausting all procedural,

142.
143.

K.G.F.,
Id. T 44.

26-27 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-21-101(4), -115(5)).
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factual, and statutory grounds for an opinion.144
The first "turning" is troublesome because the reasoning
behind it is not apparent. As noted above, a vague statutory
statement of "right to counsel" does not define counsel's roles or
obligations.
No party to KG.F. asserted the involuntary
commitment statutes were facially unconstitutional, so three
alternative lines of reasoning are possible.
First, K.G.F.
arguably contested the statute as applied to her, insofar as the
mere appointment of a public defender did not meet the
constitutional requirements of due process. Second (and more
likely), the court ensured the statutory right to counsel was
consistent with the constitutional right to due process by
reaching beyond the statute to the constitution. Third, the court
could have hinged its "turning" on statutory language providing
that statutory procedural rights exist "[i]n addition to any other
rights that may be guaranteed by the constitution." 145 In any
event, the court probably should have clarified its decision apply
constitutional analysis with something more than "turning."
More troubling than the first "turning" was the second,
which led to the invocation of fundamental rights to privacy and
dignity. Although the cited statutes are published near the
statutes applicable to hearings, the statutes clearly apply to the
treatment phase, not the hearing phase. 46 Beginning from this
tenuous starting place, the court took the following path: (1)
treatment statutes, (2) constitutional right to dignity, (3)
Armstrong v. State, (4) statutes applicable to hearings but
lacking the word "dignity", (5) Armstrong again, (6)
constitutional right to privacy, (7) statutes applicable to
hearings that do not mention "privacy" but support the concept
of "medical-decision personal autonomy."147 The court concluded
this long and winding road by stating, "That these fundamental
constitutional rights are at issue during all phases of the
involuntary commitment process.. .is self evident." 148
The
144. See, e.g., In re Mental Health of S.J., 231 Mont. 353, 355, 753 P.2d 319 (1988)
("Because we are reversing on statutory grounds, we decline to address appellants'
constitutional claims."). See also Illinois v. Carmody, 653 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ill. App.
1995).
145.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115.

146. Obviously, K.G.F. was a "patient" in that she was voluntarily admitted to a
facility. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-102(13). If the holdings of K.G.F. were limited to
those respondents who already are patients, the application of these statutes would not
present a problem. However, the KG.F. opinion does not so limit itself.
147. KG.F., IT 44-47.
148. Id. 48.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/11

22

2003

TAKING
LIBERTIES
Dahl:
In re Mental
Health of K.G.F.

following is a closer examination of the court's journey.
1. FundamentalRights: Skimming Over Plain Liberty
The court did not need to discuss medical decision personal
autonomy and dignity at all, because the fundamental right at
issue under due process analysis easily could have been freedom
from confinement or restraint. Instead of beginning with the
applicable procedural rights statute, 149 the court started with
Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 17.150 After rejecting
the Strickland standard, the court began its due process
analysis by noting, "our legal system... has seemingly lost its
way in vigilantly protecting the fundamental rights" of
respondents."'15 The lack of time available to K.G.F.'s counsel
for preparation of the case provided an example of this "loss."52
The court then decreed that the "fundamental liberty interests"
at issue in the due process clause were dignity and privacy,
including the right to personal autonomy. 5 3
While dignity and privacy certainly are liberty interests, the
court ignored the most obvious liberty interest, i.e., freedom
from confinement or restraint. This "plain liberty" is perhaps
the most recognizable liberty interest, and involuntary
commitment certainly threatens the right to "plain liberty"
because it can result in confinement. In its prefatory comments
about due process, the KG.E. court cited several cases in which
the interest at stake was freedom from bodily restraint. 54
However, the court defined the relevant "fundamental liberty
interests" as the right to privacy and the right to dignity. 15 5 At
no point did the court articulate its reasoning for choosing to
149.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115.

150. K.G.F., 41. Of course, the "turning" in 27 may explain this omission.
151. Id.
42. The court cited two Montana cases for the proposition that courts
should ensure proper commitment procedures were followed, but these cases would
presumably strengthen the "system" rather than weaken it. The court apparently took
"judicial notice" of the legal system "los [ing] its way."
152. KG.F., 43 (noting counsel had four or five working hours to prepare).
153. Id. J9 44-49.
154. Id. T 24 (citing In re W.M., 252 Mont. 225, 229, 828 P.2d 378, 381 (1992), In re
Shennum, 210 Mont. 442, 450-51, 684 P.2d 1073, 1078 (1984) (also noting damage to
reputation), and Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
155. Id.
44-50. Without discussing dignity or personal autonomy, the court
recently stated that a suspended commitment still implicated a respondent's liberty
interests when she was subjected to inpatient treatment, therapy, and prescribed
medication. In re Mental Health of T.J.D., 2002 MT 24,
21, 308 Mont. 222, 21, 41
P.3d 323, 21 (harmless error doctrine did not apply because "her liberty was restricted"
and "the stigma.. .remains").
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base its decision on privacy and dignity, rather than on
156
confinement alone.
One explanation for the court's decision to define liberty less
literally might have been the court's desire to address K.G.F.'s
right to refuse treatment. KG.F. was not a right to refuse
treatment case, but K.G.F.'s refusal of medication probably led
to her commitment proceedings. Therapeutic jurisprudence
scholar Bruce J. Winick analyzed the grounding of right to
refuse treatment in the "liberty" interests of bodily integrity,
mental privacy, and individual autonomy. 157 Noting the United
States Supreme Court's failure to define the "significant liberty
interest" at issue in cases of involuntary medication, 5 8 Winick
explored the expanding concept of liberty in due process
arguments. 159 However, because KG.F. did not center on the
right to refuse treatment and because the court did not define
the liberty interests as such, this explanation is not entirely
satisfactory.
Another reason for the KG.F. court's decision could have
rested in statutory provisions for outpatient care, insofar as
applying those provisions would result in little or no bodily
restraint. 160 However, even if K.G.F. were only committed to a
treatment program and not to a residential facility, her freedom
of movement, or "plain liberty" would arguably be implicated.
Moreover, as the court noted, Montana's 2001 legislature struck
the former statutory provision allowing commitment to
156. The court cited three cases in which due process protections were founded on
liberty interests to remain free from confinement: In re Mental Health of L.C.B., 253
Mont. 1, 830 P.2d 1299 (1992); In re J.B., 217 Mont. 504, 705 P.2d 598 (1985); In re
Morlock, 261 Mont. 499, 862 P.2d 415 (1993). KG.F., %%38, 42, 58, 62, 65.
157.

BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 201-222

(Am. Psychol. Ass'n 1997).
Winick's discussion of bodily integrity includes nonconstitutional and Fourth Amendment cases. Id. at 202-03. Winick also analyzed
constitutional arguments based on freedom of expression (mental processes), cruel and
unusual punishment, free exercise of religion, and equal protection. Id. at 131-85, 22338, 243-48, 251-57. The Montana Supreme Court rejected constitutional claims in an
involuntary medication case, when the respondent failed to frame her arguments under
the relevant statutory scheme. In re Mental Health of S.C., 2000 MT 370,
10, 303
Mont. 444, 9110, 15 P.3d 861, 9110 (involuntary medication did not require finding of
incompetence, and constitutional arguments failed because they were not couched in the
statutory scheme).
158. WINICK, supra note 157, at 201 (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133-34
(1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990)).
159. Id. at 189-201 (tracing history of purely procedural due process through the
Fourteenth Amendment and Slaughter-House era to substantive due process cases).
160. For a discussion of outpatient commitments in New York, see Ilissa L. Watnik,
A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra's Law: New York's Solution for Treatment of the
ChronicallyMentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1181 (2001).
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outpatient therapy. 161 Therefore, the court's decision to consider
privacy and dignity rather than "plain liberty" is puzzling.
2. Medical-DecisionPersonalAutonomy
The KG.F. court based much of its "fundamental rights"
holdings on Armstrong v. State.162 In Armstrong, health care
providers who performed abortion services including counseling
and referrals successfully asserted that the Montana
Constitution's privacy clause "broadly guarantees each
individual the right to make medical judgments affecting her or
his bodily integrity and health in partnership with a chosen
health care provider free from government interference." 163 A
statute that prohibited physician's assistants from performing
164
abortions was declared unconstitutional.
Citing Armstrong, the KG.F. court declared patientrespondents have the right to "medical-decision personal
65
autonomy," a right "at issue" during commitment proceedings.
To say medical-decision personal autonomy is "at issue"
during commitment proceedings is accurate, but the right to
autonomy is hollow if statutes box it out. By its nature, an
involuntary commitment proceeding denies a patient-respondent
the right to decide individual medical issues "free from
government interference" because the commitment itself is such
a decision. 166 Additionally, an involuntarily committed person
usually does not choose his or her treatment team with which to
form a "partnership."
To bolster its discussion, the court cited statutes providing
161. KG.F., 42 n.6 (noting alterations of MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-127).
162. Id. 1 45-47 (citing Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d
364).
163. Armstrong, 14.
164. Armstrong,
58-66.
165. Id. $1 47-48 (citing Armstrong,
39). The discussion of medical-decision
personal autonomy may prove ironic for some medical professionals. As the court noted,
involuntary commitment statutes prohibit respondents from waiving the right to
counsel. KG.F., 1 26 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-119(1)). Medical professionals
may view with cynicism a framework in which respondents have the constitutional right
of autonomy to refuse medications but cannot refuse an attorney's representation.
166.
See ROBERT F. SCHOPP, COMPETENCE, CONDEMNATION, AND COMMITMENT: AN
INTEGRATED THEORY OF MENTAL HEALTH LAw 19 (2001) (noting "apparent paradox" of

patients committed pursuant to parens patriae justifications but still able to refuse
treatment); PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE

LIMITS OF CHANGE 148-49 (Oxford U. Press 1994) (since society has chosen not to add
incompetence as a prerequisite to involuntary commitment, competent people should be
subject not only to involuntary commitment, but also to involuntary medication).
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respondents the right to refuse or to take medications before a
hearing and the right to choose a professional person to examine
the respondent and testify at the hearing. 167 These statutes are
not relevant to medical-decision personal autonomy. The right
to refuse or to take medications before a hearing certainly
relates to bodily integrity, but the purpose of the statutory
provision is to allow the respondent to appear at the hearing
unimpaired, either by his condition or by drugs. A respondent's
right to choose a professional person to examine him and testify
at a hearing does not equate to a choice of medical care
providers.
The chosen professional person functions as an
expert witness, not as a treatment provider.
If K.G.F. were involuntarily sedated before her hearing or
her chosen professional person were not allowed to testify, the
cited statutes would, be relevant to her due process rights.
However, these rights would not be rooted in the constitutional
right to personal autonomy.
Medical-decision personal
autonomy is threatened at two main points in involuntary
commitment: when the respondent is committed and when the
respondent is involuntarily medicated.
The commitment
proceeding itself presumes the court, and not the respondent,
will make the medical decision about commitment. Counsel was
not asked to defend K.G.F.'s right to refuse medication while
committed.
In fact, St. Peter's professional person stated
involuntary medication was not necessary, and K.G.F. had
indicated she would take her medication. 168 Future litigants
may find KG.F.'s discussion of "medical-decision personal
autonomy" more confusing than helpful.
3. Dignity
The court's discussion of dignity was also unnecessary, but
it was better reasoned. Armstrong also provided support for the
KG.F. court's discussion of dignity rights derived from Montana
Constitution, Article II, Section 4.169 The court cited statutory
provisions clearly relevant to the hearing proceeding itself. 170
The concept of dignity is related to the statutory provision that
respondents can dress in their own clothes at the hearing, rather

167.
168.
169.
170.

KG.E.,
47 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-21-115(9), (11), (12);53-21-124(3).
Tr. Dist. Ct. at 6:1-5.
KG.F., 1 45 (citing Armstrong, 72).
Id. 46 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-21-115; 53-32 -116; 53-21-119).
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than in a patient's garb. 171 The K.G.F. court interpreted the
location of the proceeding in a courtroom, rather than in a
mental health facility, as a requirement that "enhances the
dignity afforded to the individual."1 72 Insofar as the respondent
is not required to argue his case on the mental health
173
professional's "turf," this is probably an accurate statement.
The court cited a law review article by Matthew 0. Clifford
and Thomas P. Huff that suggested various applications of the
dignity clause at Article II, Section 4, of the Montana
Constitution. 174 The article begins with a discussion of Gryczan
v. State, 75 a case in which the Montana Supreme Court struck
down a deviate sexual conduct statute because it violated the
Montana Constitution's right to privacy in Article II, Section 10.
In the course of this discussion, the authors stated the following:
Interestingly, [the] dignity clause, which was discussed in some
detail in the briefs of the parties and amici in Gryczan, received no
attention from the court in its opinion.
We believe this is
unfortunate, but entirely understandable.
The Montana
Constitution's dignity clause is unusual, and its meaning, scope,
176
and legal significance are not, at first glance, obvious or clear.

If ever a law review article baited a court to rule in a particular
manner, this article did so. The Montana Supreme Court may
well have felt the urge to prove it understands the dignity clause
and is not afraid to apply it. However, this urge is probably not
sufficient reason to invoke the dignity clause unnecessarily.
As stated above, the right to liberty in its most literal sense
was clearly a sufficient fundamental liberty interest subject to
due process protections. Absent explicit explanation, the court's
decision to invoke Montana's privacy and dignity clauses seems
177
illogical.
171.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115(10).
172. KG.F., 46.
173.
If this statement was meant to imply that the dignity of the court would
automatically translate into dignity for the respondent, the statement may be
questionable. The court noted the 2001 legislature's authorization of two-way electronic
audio-video communications, but declined to address the new provision. KG.F., 46 n.7
(discussing MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-122, as amended in 2001).
174. KG.F., 55 (citing Matthew 0. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on
the Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution's "Dignity" Clause with Possible
Applications, 61 MONT. L. REV. 301, 330-332 (2000)). Montana is not the only state with
a dignity clause. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
175.
283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997).
176. Clifford & Huff, supra note 175, at 302.
177. For an argument that dignity should be the basis for privacy and liberty
interest claims, see Luis Anibal Aviles Pagan, Human Dignity, Privacy and Personality
Rights in the Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany, the United States and the
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E. Analysis of the New Standards
The court created avoidable uncertainty by adopting new
standards without applying them to K.G.F.'s counsel. As stated
earlier, the court adopted portions of the National Center for
State Courts' Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment
(hereinafter "Guidelines"). 178
These Guidelines supplement
statutes regarding counsel responsibilities in commitment
hearings. 179 In addition to governing statutory provisions,
counsel in an involuntary commitment procedure must meet the
following requirements.
1. Counsel must have specialized course training or supervised
on-the-job training in the duties,
skills, and ethics of representing
180
civil commitment respondents.
2. Counsel "should be prepared to discuss the available18options"
1
and the "practical and legal consequences" of each option.
3. Before or after the initial client interview, counsel should also
attempt to interview all persons with knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the commitment
petition and be
82
prepared to call those people as witnesses.'
4. Counsel must meet with the respondent to explain the petition
and proceedings and ascertain the client's wishes must
be held
183
privately and sufficiently before any scheduled hearing.
5. Counsel must "represent the perspective of the respondent
and.. .serve as a vigorous advocate for the respondent's wishes,"
"advocate the position that best safeguards and advances" the
interest of uncommunicative clients, and "engage in all
aspects of
184
advocacy and vigorously argue" for the client in court.

Although these standards appear fairly clear-cut, the court's
failure or refusal to apply these standards to K.G.F.'s counsel
leaves several questions open. For example, what amount or
type of training is required? Is counsel required to raise all
available options as possibilities during the client interview, or
will it suffice to prepare to discuss options if the client asks

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 343 (1998) (especially noting
Germany's dignity-centered constitutional jurisprudence).
178. K.G.F., 70. The Guidelines appear at 10 MENTAL AND PHYS. DISABILITY L.
REP. 409 (1986).
179. Id. 91 71-89. The new standards supplement title 53, chapter 21, of the
Montana Code.
180. KG.F., 171.
181. Id. 75.
182. Id. 76.
183. KGF., 9I 77-79.
184. Id. 1 86.
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about them? If a client suggests the Prince of Sweden has
"knowledge" of relevant facts, is counsel obligated to try to
interview the Swedish ambassadors, or is the determination of
"all persons with knowledge" within the attorney's discretion? If
a public defender's office is overburdened, are the "sufficient"
time requirements flexible? 8 5 Must counsel document each
decision made, the basis for the decision, and the time spent
following particular courses of action?
Most important is the question of how counsel should
respond to a time-crunched court. 8 6 Montana has a small bar,
and attorneys often appear before the same judge repeatedly. If
a judge demonstrates hostility to requests for time or to
counsel's attempts to meet K.G.F. standards, counsel must make
a difficult choice. A public defender could see the same judge
every day, and irritating the judge in one case could prove to
have negative consequences in others. However, allowing a
judge to rush a case could compromise an individual client's
rights to a day in court and result in a finding of ineffective
assistance. K.G.F. did not address this concern, except to say
"we again emphasize that it is not only counsel for the patientrespondent, but also courts, that are charged with the duty of
safeguarding the due process rights of individuals involved at
every stage of the proceedings, and must therefore rigorously
adhere to the standards expressed herein, as well as those
mandated under Title 53, Chapter 21."187 Clearly, the practical
effects of such a mandate are questionable.
The court avoided applying these standards to K.G.F.'s
counsel by finding the record insufficient. Carefully avoiding
any criticism of counsel's performance, the court instead
engaged in a discussion of the system:
[W]e emphasize that what follows is not meant as a per se
indictment of the individual counsel here or appointed counsel in
these matters in general; nor is it a tacit censure of the individual
professionals involved, who undoubtedly have sound therapeutic
objectives in mind. Rather, our aim is on the failure of the system

185. The Montana chapter of the ACLU has filed suit alleging that public defenders'
offices in seven counties have provided or will provide inadequate assistance and
otherwise violate indigent defendants' constitutional rights, in part because the offices
are overworked. White v. Martz, No. 2002-133 (Mont. 1st Jud. Ct. July 24, 2002)
(denying defendants' motion to dismiss).
186. The District Court judge's conduct during K.G.F.'s hearing was not presented
as an issue on appeal, but she clearly wanted the hearing to end on schedule. See supra
text accompanying notes 57-58.
187. KG.F., 92.
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188

As noted earlier, K.G.F. outlined eight specific actions for
the Montana Supreme Court to review.1 8 9 The court dismissed
K.G.F.'s assertion of a missed hearsay objection, finding it
"minuscule in comparison to the failure to fully investigate and
comprehend a patient's circumstances prior to an involuntary
civil commitment hearing or trial."190 However, K.G.F. also
asserted lack of preparation, as evidenced by the record. The
K.G.F. court failed to explain why K.G.F.'s citations to the
record were insufficient and instead remanded for a "fact finding
hearing." 19 1
In her appellant brief, K.G.F. pointed to the record in
support of her allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.
First, she noted the "disjointed, perfunctory, and.. .harmful"
cross-examination of Nancy McVean, which included an
elucidation of testimony that K.G.F. was "capable of carrying out
a suicide attempt... a sincere one." 192 Counsel apparently did
not know McVean could not testify as an expert on medications,
and he did not secure the presence of Dr. Caldwell, who might
have testified about FDA approval and side effects of
medications. 193 Next, K.G.F. noted counsel's failure to ask about
the threat to K.G.F.'s health and his failure to learn K.G.F. had
not requested her release in writing, which meant she was still
voluntarily admitted at St. Peter's. 194 Additionally, K.G.F.
argued counsel's direct examination of Nancy Adams was
"poorly planned and executed," because he should have ensured
Adams would know of available treatment options and because
he did not follow up on Adams' testimony that K.G.F. did not
pose an imminent threat of harm to herself. 195 K.G.F. also
asserted that counsel should have called K.G.F.'s husband to
testify, especially given Adams' testimony that he was K.G.F.'s
"closest support.' 1 96 K.G.F. noted that counsel had asked her
only one question about treatment available to her in her own
188. Id.
49.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 63 through 70.
190. KGF.,
37. The court recently reversed a commitment based entirely on
inadmissible hearsay. In re Mental Health of T.J.D., 2002 MT 24, 11 16-18, 308 Mont.
222, TT 16-18, 41. P.3d 323, TT 16-18
191. KGF., 93.
192. Appellant Br. at 10-11 (citing Tr. Dist. Ct. at 8-10).
193. Id. at 11-12 (citing Tr. Dist. Ct. at 9:11-14; 10:3-12)
194. Id. at 12-13 (citing Tr. Dist. Ct. at 7:16-17).
195. Id. at 13 (citing Tr. Dist. Ct. at 11:15-25; 12:10-11).
196. Id. at 13 (citing Tr. Dist. Ct. at 14:18-20).
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community, despite her obvious personal knowledge of her
illness, threats of self harm, and medications. 197 Finally, K.G.F.
cited counsel's lack of a closing argument as evidence of
198
ineffective assistance.
The KG.F. court certainly may have found the record
insufficient to determine whether counsel properly acted, but at
the very least, it should have acknowledged K.G.F.'s citations to
the record and explained why they were insufficient. Strangely,
the court actually noted counsel only had "at best four or five
working hours-amidst his usual case load of criminal
matters-to prepare," but still could not determine whether his
assistance was effective. While the court may have wished to
spare defense counsel's reputation, the remand seems
superfluous in light of his documented time constraints. Surely,
he could not have done all that was required by K.G.F.
standards in four or five hours, and he did not request
additional time. The K.G.F. court's bald assertion that the
record was insufficient provides no guidance for determining
either effective performances or sufficient records.
F. The Remand-ProceduralConcerns
The finding of an insufficient record was not the only
difficulty with the remand.
In fact, KG.F.'s remand may
present the most challenging issues for future participants in
Montana involuntary commitment proceedings. First, the court
defied precedent by remanding without first reversing for an
existing procedural defect. Second, the court indicated the
individual rights defined in K.G.F. should be balanced against
the state's interests in protecting society and individuals, but
did not set forth criteria or a specific test for the district court to
apply in its "balancing." Finally, the remand bears similarities
to post-conviction relief, which may again blur the lines between
criminal and commitment proceedings.
1. Precedent and ProceduralDefects
Because precedent required an evidentiary hearing only
after at least one procedural defect mandated reversal, KG.F.'s
remand may be inconsistent with precedent. The Montana
Supreme Court "previously reversed civil commitment actions

197.
198.

Id. at 14 (citing Tr. Dist. Ct. at 17:10-25).
Appellant Br. at 14-15.
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for violations of procedural defects and remanded to the district
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to examine claims of
additional procedural defects" in In re Mental Health of S.J.199
In S.J., the appellate court determined that the district court
had failed to document two respondents' waivers of certain
rights and the facts supporting a finding of serious mental
illness, as required by title 53, chapter 21, sections 119 and 127
of the Montana Code, respectively. 20 0 The Montana Supreme
Court reversed on these grounds, because a contemporaneous
record was required by statutes. The patient-respondents also
alleged the district court failed to document service of notice, the
court's advice of respondent's rights, the appointment of a
person as friend of respondent, the certification of an expert as a
"professional person," and the receipt of a written report by the
Noting that contemporaneous
professional person. 20 1
documentation of these items was not required by statute, the
court remanded for an evidentiary hearing because the court
was required to note in its order of commitment that the
patient-respondents had the benefit of all applicable and
20 2
statutory rights and "the record [was] bare."
Clearly, KG.F. is distinguishable from S.J. First, the
actions of counsel, not the court, are at issue. Second, the
appellate court found no violations to which "additional"
violations could attach. Third, KG.F. was decided largely on a
constitutional basis. The inquiry in S.J. was whether the court
met its statutory obligations. Arguably, the S.J. court could
avoid further investigation by amending its order to read,
"Respondent has received the benefit of all applicable and
statutory rights." In KG.F., the court must examine all five of
K.G.F.'s claims, applying all applicable statutes, adopted
Guidelines, and constitutional considerations. Of course, no rule
provides that only easy issues can be determined in evidentiary
hearings, but appellate courts generally instruct lower courts
what specifically is at issue. The KG.F. court listed several
factors to consider, but gave the lower court no guidance about
how to apply those factors to the present case. Additionally, the
court did not limit the focus of the inquiry. This provides the
makings for a strange and readily appealable evidentiary

199.
200.
201.
202.

Reply Br. at 18 (citing 231 Mont. 353, 753 P.2d 319 (1988)) (emphasis added).
231 Mont. at 355-56, 753 P.2d at 320.
Mental Health of S.J., 231 Mont. at 355-56, 753 P.2d at 320.
Id.
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hearing.
2. The Undefined Balancing Test
Before setting forth the duties of counsel in involuntary
commitment, the K G.F. court gave the following instruction:
[Ilt is imperative in applying the following standards to the matter
at bar, and all subsequent cases, that the constitutional and
legislated rights discussed herein are formally and fairly balanced
with the State's ultimate power to protect both the individual and
20 3
the public from actual or perceived harm.

However, the court listed no criteria and no specific test to use
in this balancing process. If the test is "imperative," it would
seem crucial to define how a court should measure the state's
"ultimate power" against an individual's fundamental right.
Some balancing tests measure the state's interest against an
individual's interest, but the balance here involves state power,
not interest.
Besides, the state's interest in commitment
proceedings is always protection of citizens, which would
presumably be compelling under any type of scrutiny.
Additionally, given the undue stigma of mental illness
acknowledged by the court, how does public perception of the
mentally ill as dangerous people figure into a balancing test?
Clearly, this test needs refinement before a "formal" or fair
balance can occur.
3. Analogy toPostconvictionRelief
By creating a post-appellate hearing, the K.G.F. court may
have created even more similarities between commitment and
criminal law. In criminal law, postconviction hearings are
statute. 20 4
by
sanctioned
are
and
practice
common
Postconviction hearings allow a petitioner to assert the error of
his conviction even after appeal, as long as the grounds for relief
could not have been reasonably raised on direct appeal.20 5 As
noted by mental health advocates, 20 6 civil commitment statutes
do not provide for "post commitment hearings" to ensure
respondents were afforded due process rights. However, as
203. KG.F., T 65.
204. Montana Post-Conviction Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-21-101 to-203 (2001).
For more information about Montana's application of this act, see Jeffrey T. Renz, PostConviction Relief in Montana, 55 MONT. L. REV. 331 (1994).
205. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-21-102; 46-21-105(2) (2001).

206. Telephone Interview with Anita Roessman, Montana Advocacy Program (Feb.
1, 2002).
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Justice Trieweiler suggested in his dissent, K.G.F. may have
20 7
created the right to a post appellate hearing.
Just two and a half months after publishing K.G.F., the
Montana Supreme Court decided a criminal postconviction case
called State v. Whitlow. 20 8
In Whitlow, a postconviction
petitioner asserted his counsel was ineffective because he failed
to follow up on certain responses from prospective jurors during
voir dire.20 9 The District Court granted the State's motion to
dismiss the petition because Whitlow could have raised this
issue on direct appeal. 210
Reversing the lower court, the
Montana Supreme Court determined Whitlow's ineffectiveness
claim was not "record based. '2 11 The court distinguished an
earlier case, State v. Chastain,212 a direct appeal in which
defense counsel's failure to follow up on prospective jurors'
statements was clearly ascertainable from the record. Unlike
Chastain, Whitlow's trial counsel could have a "satisfactory
explanation" for failing to follow up on jury voir dire questions,
because he "could have known other facts about these
prospective jurors." 213
Because review of the trial record
necessarily required giving "every indulgence" that defense
counsel's acts were tactical, facts outside the trial record may be
214
necessary to prove or disprove the strategy of counsel.
One reason the K.G.F. court rejected Strickland standards
was that the presumption of sound trial strategy was
2 15
inappropriate to involuntary commitment proceedings.
Because this presumption does not exist in commitment
proceedings, the Whitlow reasoning for allowing facts outside
the record to prove "strategy" is not applicable.
K.G.F.
formulated eight arguments based on the record alone, but the
court declined to address any of them. As the first court to
207. KG.F., 110 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
208. 2001 MT 208, 306 Mont. 339, 33 P.3d 877. It seems reasonable to infer that
the court was aware of Whitlow at the time it deliberated K.G.F. Note that four of five
justices deciding this case wrote separate opinions respectively advocating the
modification, overruling, and affirmance of State v. Chastain, 285 Mont. 61, 947 P.2d 57
(1997). Whitlow I 27-30 (Regnier, J., concurring and advocating modification);
31-43
(Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, advocating overruling); IT 44-54
(Trieweiler and Cotter, J.J., concurring, advocating affirmance).
209. Whitlow, 8.
210. Whitlow,
8-9.
211. Id. IT 21-22.
212. 285 Mont. 61, 947 P.2d 57 (1997).
213. Whitlow, 21.
214. Id. 21.
215. Id.
34-35.
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examine the record for signs of ineffective assistance, the
Montana Supreme Court could have mentioned K.G.F.'s
arguments and offered guidance to the lower court for what
missing facts would indicate effectiveness or ineffectiveness.
It is not clear if all involuntary commitment appeals for
ineffective assistance of counsel will be remanded. It may be
that the KG.F. remand is unique, occurring only because the
new Guidelines were adopted. If Strickland applied, remanding
KG.F. for a hearing would be consistent with allowing a
postconviction petition in Whitlow. In both cases, the court
seems to imply that something beyond the record may surface to
support or detract from an ineffective assistance claim.
However, the judicial economy of such decisions is questionable,
especially since the Strickland effectiveness presumption does
not apply. In direct appeals, parties are generally not allowed to
submit evidence outside the record. If consideration of evidence
outside the record is necessary to determine the mere possibility
of tactical strategy in ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
the direct appeal process may be meaningless.
VI. POST-K.G.F. DEVELOPMENTS
Since KG.F., the controversy over civil commitment and
mental health law has resurfaced. Not surprisingly, lobbyists,
legislators, and the press 216 have been greatly concerned with
the financial implications of KG.F. and other proposed changes
to the mental health system. 217 Recent cuts in state funding to
216. See, e.g., Vera Haffey, Mental Health Stalling, THE MONTANA STANDARD, Jan.
27, 2002, at Al (discussing burden on public defenders, increase of costs at Warm
Springs, and practical consequences of delaying care for those in need). Above Haffey's
byline appeared the following language: "High court ruling creating bottleneck in
involuntary commitment process."
217. Critics might view the KG.F. court's omission of financial considerations as the
proverbial "elephant in the room." Others have noted the general effects of financial
constraints on Montana's mental health system. In a special session, the Montana
legislature cut several programs, and the 2003 regular session will address further cuts.
See
http://www.discoveringmontana.com/budget/contentbudget/2005-budget!
OVERVIEW.pdf;
http://www.discoveringmontana.com/budget/content/budget/2005-budget/OBPP%20B.pdf
For a general overview of some effects of these cuts on Montana's mental health care
system,
see
Montana
Mental
Health
Ombudsman's
Report
(2002),
at
http://www.dphhs.state.mt.us/about-us/divisions/addictive-mental-disorders/services/an
nual-report_2002.pdf (noting lack of state funding resulted in elimination of some
Montana drop-in centers and school programs). Some people suffering from mental
illness testified before the Montana legislature about the effects of a budget "rollback"
and proposed future cuts.
Allison Farrell, Lawmakers Hear Pleas for Funding,
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mental health programs may decrease voluntary treatment and
trigger a corresponding increase in involuntary commitment.
Steven J. Morse has argued that absent a financial commitment
to adequate mental health care, involuntary commitment is
largely ineffectual and should be abolished, or at least severely
limited. 218 While such a position may be extreme, it may have
support in Montana.
One meeting about mental health services, facilitated by the
Montana Consensus Council, displayed the diverse interests and
opinions held by various Montanans who do not hold legislative
offices. 2 19 At this meeting, interested groups defined the lack of
definition and organization in Montana mental health care as a
major issue to consider in the future. 220 To attain the best
possible mental health system would require statutory changes,
new money from the legislature, re-organizing existing
resources. 22 ' Interested parties warned that entities should
avoid cost shifting and should pay extra attention to Montana's
222
Native American population.
One idea is to grant jurisdiction over involuntary
commitments to the Department of Health and Human Services,
Of course, this option would
an executive agency. 223
significantly reduce the role of the judiciary and legislature in
involuntary commitment law. Another idea is to "[d]evelop ways
MISSOULIAN, Jan. 15, 2003, at Al. In addition to general budget cuts, the 2003 Montana
Legislature will consider changes to the mental health system, including the following:
(1) making the Mental Health Ombudsman a discretionary position (H.R. 191); (2)
authorizing counsel to determine, in conjunction with the client, that expedited
treatment is necessary (S. 48); (3) shortening community commitment time to 3 months,
unless the respondent has previously been committed (S. 55); and (4) requiring petitions
for civil commitment to be provided to the Department of Health and Human Services
and the institution where a respondent may be committed (S. 64). See www.leg.mt.us
(follow "Bills-2003 Regular Session" link).
218. Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54, 80-81 (1982).
See also
219. http://www.discoveringmontana.com/mcclcss/projects/listing.asp.
Meeting Summary: Forum on Mental Health Commitment Law Issues, ADA: Mental
Health-Law Enforcement Rendezvous, Helena, Mont. (Jan. 22, 2002) (hereinafter
"Rendezvous") (on file with the author).
220. Rendezvous at 2.
221. Id. at 3.
222. Id. at 4. Mental health care access for Native Americans is a complex issue,
beyond the purview of this note.
223. Id. at 3. Municipalities and counties in Florida, California, Texas, Arkansas,
LeRoy L. Kondo, Note,
and Washington have established mental health courts.
Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of
Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 373 (2000).
However, these courts are not executive, or administrative law, courts.
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to reduce the due process requirements in the interest of mental
health [to avoid] over-criminaliz[ing] the mental health
system." 224 While this option is vague, more specific ideas
include eliminating jury trials, devoting more resources to
Montana State Hospital as an alternative to community based
treatment, and reducing the number of hearings from 3 to 2.225
Some wish to expand the already lengthy legislative history of
the statutes by recodifying the entire act. Although some
experts discourage blending the roles of "professional person"
and therapist, some Montanans apparently wish to explore the
idea of mandating a "continuing connection between the patient"
and the petitioning professional is apparently set for
exploration. 226 All of these notions are directly related to the
K.G.F. opinion, and they demonstrate the controversies in
mental health law.
VII.CONCLUSION

In the debate surrounding civil commitment, almost
everyone involved in the debate is at least partly right. Only
those who have experience with the mental health system can
fully understand the practical implications of ethereal debates
about liberty, autonomy, dignity, community, government,
compassion, and understanding.
Precisely because civil
commitment raises issues about these core values of society, it
will remain a controversial subject. If nothing else, the civil
commitment process provides a framework of introspective
discussion for legal practitioners, scholars, and the public.
The K.G.F. opinion probably served a therapeutic purpose
for K.G.F., but the Montana bar may find it antitherapeutic.
Attorneys appointed to represent respondents definitely should
interview clients carefully, investigate circumstances, and
protect respondents' interests.
However, most attorneys
probably knew that before K.G.F. Without an understanding of
whether K.G.F.'s counsel acted appropriately or assistance in
interpreting the new Guidelines, attorneys may have difficulty
determining whether they have met the standards.
More
importantly, KG.F. did not provide any guidance for the
attorney with limited time, few resources, and harried judges.
The court's analysis may provide some indication of the court's
224.
225.
226.

Rendezvous, supra note 219, at 3.
Id. at 3-4
Id. at 3.
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willingness to implement sparsely litigated constitutional
provisions, but only given the "right" facts and issues.
K.G.F. is an ambitious opinion in that it addressed several
difficult and controversial issues and attempted to resolve them.
However, its faults lie in its ambition. The relatively narrow
issue presented was effective assistance of counsel. In an
attempt to distinguish civil commitment from criminal
proceedings, interpret the Montana Constitution, and set new
standards for counsel, the court ignored the facts. Instead, it
indicted "the system" and attempted to affirm it in part and
reverse it in part. "The system" was not a party to the case, nor
were its faults directly at issue. Stopping short of addressing
the issue before it, the K.G.F. court raised more questions about
civil commitment than it answered.
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